Withdrawal Symptom

While the bombs and rockets are still flying between Israel and Lebanon, and fighting continues in Gaza, it is not too early to ask how this all happened and what Israel can learn from the bitter experiences.

Israel withdrew from Lebanon in 2000 and from Gaza last summer. Despite a UN Resolution that Lebanese troops should secure the southern part of that country, the entire area vacated by Israel Defense Forces ( IDF) was occupied by the radical Islamic militia known as Hezbollah (The Party of Allah). Armed with more than ten thousand rockets from Iran, transported through Syria, the fanatics raided Israel earlier this month, killing two soldiers and capturing two others. Israel and Hezbollah have been trading rockets and bombs ever since, and civilians on both sides of the border have suffered the brunt of the casualties.

Gaza, now ruled by Hamas, has been the launching ground for rockets into Israel for years. The capture of an Israeli soldier in early July, however, triggered a massive response from IDF.

Looking back with 20/20 hindsight, we can see that Israel has traded land, not for peace (as we had all hoped (1)), but for attacks from positions closer to Israel's population centers. These withdrawals were perceived by Israel's enemies as signs of weakness, which could be further exploited, rather than as goodwill gestures which could lead to a peaceful "2-state" solution to the conflict. The 2000 Intifada began only a few weeks after the withdrawal from Lebanon; it is plausible that Arafat and his followers (as well as the more fanatical Islamists) concluded that terrorism could force Israel to make further withdrawals and concesssions.

As this is written, Israeli forces are searching southern Lebanon for Hezbollah soldiers and weapons. So far their efforts have succeeded in reducing the daily rocket attacks by about two-thirds. There is no question that Israel can win this battle militarily, but the consequences for Israel's security in the future remain questionable.

Israelis are highly susceptible to what Alan Greenspan would call "irrational exuberance" about the prospects for peace with their Arab neighbors. The 1994 Oslo Accord, which gave PLO effective control of Gaza and the West Bank, was certainly the pinnacle of this exuberance. In addition, Israel is highly dependent upon American goodwill, and so often heeds American admonitions to "excercise restraint" in dealing with its enemies.

We must remember that Israel successfully traded land for peace with Egypt in 1978, and that Egypt (under two presidents) has kept the peace treaty and is a voice for peace and normalization of relations in the Arab World. The trouble is that Israel's fiercest enemies today are not established nations like Egypt ( or even Syria) but terrorist militias like Hezbollah and Hamas and the fanatic-ruled Iran. We have gone from Sadat, who made an agreement and kept it, to Arafat, who made many agreements and kept none, to the jihadists of today who do not even want agreements.

Although Israelis have no desire to rule over another people, military occupation of lands bordering on Israel is apparently the only way to prevent these lands from being used to launch attacks on the Jewish State. This means Gaza, Southern Lebanon, and the West Bank. The whole world will demand that Israel withdraw from these territories, but the world will do nothing to protect Israel from the people who live there.

But then, what becomes of the dream of a Palestinian State living peacefully alongside Israel, which President Bush, the Quartet, Peace Now and Shimon Peres still believe in? It may someday become reality, but only after a major change in attitude in the Arab and Muslim Worlds. Till then, those who long for it can keep dreaming, but Israel must remain alert and in control of its borderlands.

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(1) Including the August 17, 2005, Glazerbeam.